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Framework for prioritization of COVID-19 vaccine

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Acknowledgements

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* Drafting Subgroup Members; † Leadership in Drafting Roadmap

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Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker

By Carl Zimmer, Jonathan Corum and Sui-Lee Wee Updated November 30, 2020


PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3	LIMITED	APPROVED
40	17	13	6	0
Vaccines testing safety and dosage	Vaccines in expanded safety trials	Vaccines in large-scale efficacy tests	Vaccines approved for early or limited use	Vaccines approved for full use

New York Times

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Allocation, Prioritization, and Recommendations



COVAX Allocation Framework

SAGE Values Framework


Prioritization Roadmap

Vaccine-Specific Recommendations

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Values Framework Core Principles



- Human Well-Being
- Global Equity
- Reciprocity
- Equal Respect
- National Equity
- Legitimacy

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Principles	Objectives
Well-Being	Reduce deaths and disease burden from the COVID-19 pandemic Reduce societal and economic disruption including strategies for containing transmission, reducing severe disease and death, or some combination Protect the continuing functioning of essential services, including health services
Equal Respect	Treat the interests of all individuals and groups with equal consideration as allocation and priority-setting decisions are being taken and implemented Offer a meaningful opportunity to access vaccine to all individuals and groups who qualify for vaccine under prioritization criteria.
Global Equity	Ensure that vaccine allocation takes into account the special epidemic risks and needs of low-and-middle-income countries
National Equity	Ensure that vaccine prioritization within countries takes into account the vulnerabilities, risks and needs of groups who, because of underlying societal and/or biomedical factors, are at risk of experiencing greater burdens from the COVID-19 pandemic Develop the immunization delivery systems and infrastructure required to ensure COVID-19 vaccines access to priority populations and to take proactive action to ensure equal access to everyone who qualifies under a priority group, particularly socially disadvantaged populations
Reciprocity	Protect those who bear significant additional risks and burdens of COVID-19 to safeguard the welfare of others, including healthcare and other essential workers
Legitimacy	Engage all countries in a transparent consultation process for determining what scientific, public health, and values criteria should be used to make decisions about vaccine allocation between countries Employ best available scientific evidence, expertise, and significant engagement with relevant stakeholders for vaccine prioritization between various groups within each country, using transparent, accountable, unbiased processes, to engender deserved trust in prioritization decisions

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Prioritization Roadmap



To support country planning, the Roadmap suggests public health strategies and target priority groups for different levels of vaccine availability in different epidemiologic settings.

The consensus is that currently available evidence is too limited to allow any recommendations for use of any specific vaccine against COVID-19 at this time.

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Key Assumptions



Vaccines are fully licensed and meet WHO Target Product Profiles for COVID-19 vaccines



Age-dependent efficacy unlikely to change recommendations



No substantive differences in protective immune response in subpopulations

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Key Assumptions



Vaccine is transmission-reducing sufficient to justify certain priority groups



Non-pharmaceutical interventions vary; do not lower vaccine efficacy when relaxed



Prioritization does not account for variation in population seropositivity or existing protection



Risk of severe disease not separately accounted for in prioritization, assumed to correlate with risk of death

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Prioritization Dimensions



Epidemiologic Scenario



Overall Public Health Strategy



Vaccine Supply Scenarios

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Epidemiologic Scenarios



Community Transmission



Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases



No Cases

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Community Transmission

Overall Public Health Strategy


Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential services; also, reciprocity.

Expand to reduction in transmission to further reduce disruption of social and economic functions.



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Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases

Overall Public Health Strategy

Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential services; also, reciprocity.

Expand to substantially control transmission and minimize disruption of social and economic functions.



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
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No Cases

Overall Public Health Strategy


Initial focus on prevention of community transmission; also, reciprocity.

Expand to preserve control of transmission and reduce reliance on most burdensome non-pharmaceutical interventions, as well as to protect highest risk individuals in the event of importation-associated outbreaks.



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COVAX Facility Allocation Mechanism*		Roadmap of Priority Use Cases	
Phase	% country population to be covered by vaccine supply	Stage	% country population to be covered by vaccine supply
Phase 1: Proportional allocation, to cover Tier 1 target groups	Indicative initial tranche: 3%	Stage I	1-10%
	Subsequent tranches to reach 20%	Stage II	11-20%
Phase 2: Weighted allocation based on risk assessment	>20%	Stage III	21-50%

* Note: COVAX Facility Allocation Mechanism is still in draft form; further details from current draft approach available at: https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/fair-allocation-mechanism-for-covid-19-vaccines-through-the-covax-facility

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How Supply Staging of Priority Groups Relates to Population Size

Groups are staged sequentially.

Groups *within* stages are not rank ordered. (with the exception of Stages Ia and Ib)

In some countries, the amount of vaccine for a vaccine supply stage may be insufficient.

These instances will require within-stage prioritization by countries.



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Scenario: Community Transmission

Strategy: Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential services; also, reciprocity. Expand to reduction in transmission to further reduce disruption of social and economic functions.

Stage I (1-10%) Stage Ia (initial launch)	Stage II (11-20%)	Stage III (21-50%)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Older adults not covered in Stage I Individuals with comorbidities or health states determined to be at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Remaining teachers and school staff Other essential workers outside health and education sectors Pregnant Women
Stage Ib	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sociodemographic groups at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death Health workers engaged in immunization delivery High priority teachers and school staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection Personnel needed for vaccine production and other high-risk laboratory staff Social/employment groups at elevated risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to effectively physically distance

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Scenario: Sporadic Cases or Clusters of Cases

Strategy: Initial focus on direct reduction of morbidity and mortality and maintenance of most critical essential services; also, reciprocity. Expand to substantially control transmission and minimize disruption of social and economic functions.

Stage I (1-10%)	Stage II (11-20%)	Stage III (21-50%)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Emergency reserve of vaccines for utilization for outbreak response or mitigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection in the rest of the country Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region in the rest of the country Groups with comorbidities or health states determined to be at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Sociodemographic groups at significantly higher risk of severe disease or death in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Primary and secondary teachers and school staff in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Other essential workers outside health and education sectors in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Social/employment groups at elevated risk of acquiring and transmitting infection because they are unable to effectively physically distance in areas with high transmission or anticipated high transmission Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection throughout the country Age groups at high risk of transmitting infection by age-based risk specific to country/region Personnel needed for vaccine production and other high-risk laboratory staff Pregnant women

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Scenario: No Cases

Strategy: Initial focus on prevention of community transmission; also, reciprocity. Expand to preserve control of transmission and reduce reliance on most burdensome non-pharmaceutical interventions, as well as to protect highest risk individuals in the event of importation-associated outbreaks.

Stage I (1-10%)	Stage II (11-20%)	Stage III (21-50%)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at high to very high risk of acquiring and transmitting infection Essential travellers at risk for acquiring infection outside the home country and reintroducing infection upon return to home country Border protection staff screening for imported cases and workers for outbreak management Emergency reserve utilization for focused outbreak response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health workers at low to moderate risk of acquiring and transmitting infection All travellers at risk for acquiring infection outside the home country and reintroducing infection upon return to home country Emergency reserve of vaccines utilization for outbreak mitigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Older adults defined by age-based risk specific to country/region Age groups at high risk of transmitting infection by age-based risk specific to country/region Primary and secondary school teachers and staff Other essential workers outside health and education sectors

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TABLE 2 Summary Table of the Application of the Roadmap Under Various Contingencies. Adapted from National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine's Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine.

Contingency	Change in the Application of the Roadmap
Fewer vaccine courses available than expected Vaccine requires two doses, rather than one	The Roadmap is unchanged. Some individuals receive vaccination later than they would otherwise. The Roadmap is unchanged, but some individuals receive vaccination later.
Low vaccine efficacy among older adults or other population subgroup	Current modeling suggests that (given the many fold higher mortality rates among older individuals) age-dependent vaccine efficacy would not significantly change the recommendations for priority use cases in older populations. If vaccine efficacy in older adults relative to other age groups was so low that the prioritization of older adults was expected to lead to substantially worse overall outcomes in number of lives saved, the older age group individuals in each scenario would likely be moved to a lower rank. Similar considerations apply for individuals with comorbidities.
Low vaccine efficacy in preventing transmission	The importance of high coverage of the most vulnerable groups is increased.
Unanticipated vaccine adverse events	Only prioritize individuals or groups for whom vaccine benefits continue to outweigh the risks.
Vaccine acceptance and uptake is lower than expected	The Roadmap is unchanged. The community engagement and risk communication are enhanced.
More than one vaccine type available	The Roadmap is unchanged, but which vaccines are allocated to which population groups must take into account the benefits and risks of the vaccine for each population group. As authorized vaccines become available, SAGE will make vaccine-specific recommendations.
Epidemic spread is continuing when the vaccine becomes available	The Roadmap is unchanged. Public health messages must continue to stress the need for personal protective measures (e.g., masks, social distancing, hand washing, ventilation).
Risk profile of a previously identified high-risk group changes (e.g. due to high infection rate in earlier waves)	The general structure of the Roadmap is unchanged. The relevant consideration is high-risk, and if a group is no longer high-risk it should be lowered in priority. However, due to equity concerns, many of these groups are likely to be disadvantaged, the evidentiary basis for any change in priority status must be high and the burden of proof should be on the immunization programme/government to meet.
Some countries mandate vaccination of select groups	The Roadmap is unchanged, but countries mandating vaccination of select groups might allocate the vaccine in a manner different from the Roadmap.
Some employers require proof of vaccination	The Roadmap is unchanged, but such requirements could change rates of vaccine uptake, and would pose hazards for those individuals for whom the vaccine is medically contraindicated and could raise issues around discrimination for those unable to obtain the vaccine and therefore unable to work.
Some countries do not provide free vaccine access to non-citizens or people without documentation of legal status	The Roadmap is unchanged. This practice violates the principle of equity and the goals of public health. However, in such cases, other sources of financial support (e.g. philanthropy, civil society organizations, pharmaceutical companies) should be sought to provide vaccination for those individuals.

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
National Equity Considerations




Ensure that vaccine prioritization within countries takes into account the vulnerabilities, risks and needs of groups who, because of underlying societal, ethnic/racial, geographic or biomedical factors, are at risk of experiencing greater burdens from the COVID-19 pandemic.

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
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
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
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
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Social vulnerability scale

Based on 15 census track variable

Can be calculated at the census track




Race/Income Transportation Crowding 65 yrs +

ASTDR, 2018 31  Yale Institute for Global Health

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Triggers for COVID-19 vaccine mandate



Inadequately contained ACIP recommended Adequate supply

Transparent communication Infrastructure present Inadequate voluntary response

Mello, Silverman, Omer 2020, NEJM 32  Yale Institute for Global Health

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Thank You!



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